1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This is based on the idea that our society has contrasting political opinions and therefore a government’s preference should be limited. Common-law approaches to causation often require proof of but-for cause as a starting point toward proof of legal cause. Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. See Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417, 99 S.Ct. Yet the Court in Aikens reiterated that the case was to be tried under the proof scheme of Burdine. 321, 340, 825 F.2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J., dissenting). In contrast to the plurality, Justice O'CONNOR acknowledges that the approach adopted today is a "departure from the McDonnell Douglas standard." 263 U.S.App.D.C. Instead, the plaintiff must identify a particular employment practice and "must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group." James H. Heller, Washington, D.C., for respondent. . See, e.g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (CA3 1985), cert. Trial and appellate courts will therefore be saddled with the task of developing standards for determining when to apply the burden shift. At trial, counsel for Price Waterhouse twice assured the court that he did not question Dr. Fiske's expertise (App. 2362, 2371-2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (citation omitted). There is a tension between the Franks and Teamsters line of decisions and the individual disparate treatment cases cited by the dissent. Burdine, 450 U.S., at 258, 101 S.Ct., at 1096. The ultimate question in every individual disparate-treatment case is whether discrimination caused the par icular decision at issue. This difference is decisive in distinguishing this case from those involving "pretext." There has been a strong showing that the employer has done exactly what Title VII forbids, but the connection between the employer's illegitimate motivation and any injury to the individual plaintiff is unclear. 321, 825 F.2d 458 (1987). Pp. But it was the man who, as Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision to place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, Hopkins should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." * At Price Waterhouse, a nationwide professional accounting partnership, a senior manager becomes a candidate for partnership when the partners in her local office submit her name as a candidate. The second goal of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Id., at 418, 95 S.Ct., at 2372. If the employer fails to carry this burden, the factfinder is justified in concluding that the decision was made "because of" consideration of the illegitimate factor and the substantive standard for liability under the statute is satisfied. 150. [1] In criminal law, motive in itself is not an element of any given crime; however, the legal system typically allows motive to be proven to make plausible the accused's reasons for committing a crime, at least when those motives may be obscure or hard to identify with. The plurality's discussion of overdetermined causes only highlights the error of its insistence that but-for is not the substantive standard of causation under Title VII. 1891, 1897, n. 9, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977). 1478, 1481, n. 2, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). Once the consideration of race in the decisional process had been established, we held that "the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result." We have not in the past required women whose gender has proved relevant to an employment decision to establish the negative proposition that they would not have been subject to that decision had they been men, and we do not do so today. Moreover, he concluded, the firm did not give decisive emphasis to such traits only because Hopkins was a woman; although there were male candidates who lacked these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge found that these candidates possessed other, positive traits that Hopkins lacked. Nor is the finding that sex stereotyping played a part in the Policy Board's decision undermined by the fact that many of the suspect comments were made by supporters rather than detractors of Hopkins. Indeed, where a public employee brings a "disparate treatment" claim under 42 U.S.C. The limited benefits that are likely to be produced by today's innovation come at the sacrifice of clarity and practical application. While the Court has properly drawn a distinction between the elements of a class action claim and an individual disparate treatment claim, see Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 873-878, 104 S.Ct. This is seen most easily in the EEOC's regulation, which operates only after an agency or the EEOC has found that "an employee of the agency was discriminated against." the difficult hypothetical proposition that, had there been no discrimination, the employment decision would have been made in his favor"). Presumably it will be easier for a plaintiff to show that consideration of race or sex pursuant to an affirmative-action plan was a substantial factor in a decision, and the court will need to move on to the question of a plan's validity. We do not take this provision to mean that a court inevitably can find a violation of the statute without having considered whether the employment decision would have been the same absent the impermissible motive. The plurality thus effectively reads the causation requirement out of the statute, and then replaces it with an "affirmative defense." Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases, see, e.g., United States Postal Service Bd. In our adversary system, where a party has the burden of proving a particular assertion and where that party is unable to meet its burden, we assume that that assertion is inaccurate. "9 110 Cong.Rec. Economic value is the worth of a good or service determined by people's preferences and the trade-offs they choose given their scarce resources. 321, 341, 825 F.2d 458, 478 (1987) (Williams, J. dissenting). Both the policies behind the statute, and the evidentiary principles developed in the analogous area of causation in the law of torts, suggest that at this point the employer may be required to convince the factfinder that, despite the smoke, there is no fire. Our decision today treads this well-worn path. Plaintiff's Exh. See also ante, at 261, and n. (opinion of WHITE, J. Three partners recommended that her candidacy be placed on hold, eight stated that they did not have an informed opinion about her, and eight recommended that she be denied partnership. Events that are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have any "cause" at all. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (allocation of burden dispositive because no evidence of which of two negligently fired shots hit plaintiff). 601 (1987) (noting high reversal rate caused by use of Title VII burden shifting in a jury setting). Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer's decisions, the burden shifts to the employer "to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for legitimate reasons." As the Court of Appeals noted below: "While most circuits have not confronted the question squarely, the consensus among those that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated by direct evidence that discriminatory animus played a significant or substantial role in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the decision would have been the same absent discrimination." Post, at 294. It is true, as Hopkins emphasizes, that we have noted the "clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount." See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W.R. Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be correctly labele as either a "pretext" case or a "mixed-motives" case from the beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418, 95 S.Ct. Ante, at 260-261 (opinion of WHITE, J. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. The central point is this: while an employer may not take gender into account in making an employment decision (except in those very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ), it is free to decide against a woman for other reasons. Healthy City Bd. Our decisions confirm that Title VII is not concerned with the mere presence of impermissible motives; it is directed to employment decisions that result from those motives. Justice KENNEDY, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice SCALIA join, dissenting. The dissent's summary of our individual disparate treatment cases to date is fair and accurate, and amply demonstrates that the rule we adopt today is at least a change in direction from some of our prior precedents. Ante, at 247. 2469, 2473, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983).11. Healthy City Bd. Burdine compels the employer to come forward with its explanation of the decision and permits the plaintiff to offer evidence under either of the logical methods for proof of discrimination. Given that both the plaintiff and defendant bear a burden of proof in cases such as this one, it is surprising that the dissent insists that our approach requires the employer to bear "the ultimate burden of proof." Although Justice O'CONNOR advances some thoughtfu arguments for this change, I remain convinced that it is unnecessary and unwise. As Justice BRENNAN notes, ante, at 258, courts do not sit to determine whether litigants are nice. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), for use in cases such as this one where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. 263 U.S.App.D.C. See 42 U.S.C. The Court's allocation of the burden of proof in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 626-627, 107 S.Ct. " Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876, 104 S.Ct. Motive can be defined as some inner drive, feeling or impulse which causes a person to do something or act in a certain way. The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the door wide for conjecture. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. To say that Burdine's evidentiary scheme will not help us decide a case admittedly involving both kinds of considerations is not to cast aspersions on the utility of that scheme in the circumstances for which it was designed. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. Because we have held that, by proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination, the employer may avoid a finding of liability altogether and not simply avoid certain equitable relief, these authorities do not help Hopkins to show why we should elevate the standard of proof for an employer in this position. Mt. The District Judge acknowledged that Hopkins' conduct justified complaints about her behavior as a senior manager. Tr. On too many occasions, however, Hopkins' aggressiveness apparently spilled over into abrasiveness. Evidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent. As we indicated in Transportation Management Corp., the showing required by Mt. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), is a wiser course than creation of more disarray in an area of the law already difficult for the bench and bar, and so I must dissent. See post, at 286-289. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 935-937 (CA1 1987) (where plaintiff produced "strong evidence" that sexist attitudes infected faculty tenure decision, burden properly shifted to defendant to show that it would have reached the same decision absent discrimination); Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563 (CA11 1985) (direct evidence of discriminatory animus in decision to discharge college professor shifted burden of persuasion to defendant). That court remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings to determine appropriate relief, and those proceedings have been stayed pending our decision. Without directly impugning Dr. Fiske's credentials or qualifications, Price Waterhouse insinuates that a social psychologist is unable to identify sex stereotyping in evaluations without investigating whether those evaluations have a basis in reality. The suspect must have the ability to commit the crime (means), a believable reason to do it (motive), and the chance to carry it out (opportunity). The first is volitional objection, which is the argument that the person cannot manage his or her own motives and therefore cannot be punished for them. . Although her reasons for supporting this departure are not without force, they are not dispositive. Healthy City Bd. What we term "but-for" cause is the least rigorous standard that is consistent with the approach to causation our precedents describe. 110 Cong.Rec. Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69, 106 S.Ct. Tr. One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard once it has placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the employer. Congress could not have chosen a clearer way to indicate that proof of liability under Title VII requires a showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin caused the decision at issue. 1251, 1268, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, supra, 431 U.S., at 324, 367-371, 97 S.Ct., at 1870-1873; East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404, n. 9, 97 S.Ct. As these examples demonstrate, our assumption always has been that if an employer allows gender to affect its decisionmaking process, then it must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision. After comparing this description of the plaintiff's proof to that offered by Justice O'Connor's opinion, concurring in the judgment, post, at 276-277, we do not understand why the concurrence suggests that they are meaningfully different from each other, see post, at 275, 277-279. Further, the suggestion that the employer should bear the burden of persuasion due to superior access to evidence has little force in the Title VII context, where the liberal discovery rules available to all litigants are supplemented by EEOC investigatory files. The words "because of" in § 703(a)(1) of the Act, which forbids an employer to make an adverse decision against an employee "because of such individual's . Id., at 64. Price Waterhouse concedes that the proof in Transportation Management, adequately showed that the employer there had relied on an impermissible motivation in firing the plaintiff. In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." The plurality attempts to reconcile its internal inconsistency on the causation issue by describing the employer's showing as an "affirmative defense." Second, shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a situation like this one creates no incentive to preferential treatment in violation of § 2000e-2(j). Since the lower courts required Price Waterhouse to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence, they did not determine whether Price Waterhouse had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have placed Hopkins' candidacy on hold even if it had not permitted sex-linked evaluations to play a part in the decision-making process. This would even more plainly be the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors motivated the adverse action.*. Courts will also be required to make the often subtle and difficult distinction between "direct" and "indirect" or "circumstantial" evidence. Healthy City Bd. We are told next that but-for cause is not required, since the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of." 1804, 1810, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (involuntary commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 87 S.Ct. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. The defendant should then present its case, including its evidence as to legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision. of Ed. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words "because of," Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she challenges. As the dissent points out, post, at 287, n. 3, the interpretative memorandum submitted by sponsors of Title VII indicates that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred." Foriegn meddling in the 2020 elections. We decide today that the Court of Appeals had the better approach, but that both courts erred in requiring the employer to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence. Revenge, revolt, a desire to harm, dominate, or exploit and similar things are not justification for war. Common-law approaches to causation often require proof of but-for cause as a starting point toward proof of legal cause. This argument comes too late. The plaintiff should also present any direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisional process. 295, 297, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).3 I would adhere to this established evidentiary framework, which provides the appropriate standard for this and other individual disparate-treatment cases. Our holding casts no shadow on Burdine, in which we decided that, even after a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that its stated legitimate reason for the employment decision was the true reason. differently from other ultimate questions of fact"), and one of these rules is that parties to civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Pp. 25) and failed to challenge the legitimacy of her discipline. PRICE WATERHOUSE, Petitioner v. Ann B. HOPKINS. law and strong business condence may help encourage businesses to focus on capex to increase efciency and improve competitiveness. When the partners in her office later refused to repropose her for partnership, she sued petitioner in Federal District Court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, charging that it had discriminated against her on the basis of sex in its partnership decisions. 450 U.S., at 256-258, 101 S.Ct., at 1095-1096. See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772, 96 S.Ct. . Each time, we have concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive. Pp. See, e.g. The principles of the Church's social doctrine, which are based on the natural law, are then seen to be confirmed and strengthened, in the faith of the Church, by the Gospel of Christ. Under my approach, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference that the decision was made "because of" the plaintiff's protected status. § 160(c), which contains language almost identical to § 706(g)). Rather, I "remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination." Many of the legislators' statements, such as the memorandum quoted in text, focused specifically on race rather than on gender or religion or national origin. In this case, the District Court found that a number of the evaluations of Ann Hopkins submitted by partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against her election to the partnership. As Justice O'CONNOR states, the most that can be said with respect to the Title VII itself is that "nothing in the language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption" of the new approach. She was neither offered nor denied partnership but instead her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year. I am unaware of any federal prohibitory statute that is written in the past tense. If the partnership considers that proof sufficient, we do not know why it takes such vehement issue with Hopkins' proof. 1068, 99 L.Ed.2d 248 (1988). sex," requires looking at all of the reasons, both legitimate and illegitimate, contributing to the decision at the time it is made. While requiring that the plaintiff in a tort suit or a Title VII action prove that the defendant's "breach of duty" was the "but-for" cause of an injury does not generally hamper effective enforcement of the policies behind those causes of action. Motive definition is - something (such as a need or desire) that causes a person to act. Yet it goes on to state that "an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision." See alsoArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-271, n. 21, 97 S.Ct. See, e.g., Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 Va.L.Rev. Employment discrimination claims require factfinders to make difficult and sensitive decisions. Ibid. As to the employer's proof, in most cases, the employer should be able to present some objective evidence as to its probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive.14 Moreover, proving " 'that the same decision would have been justified . [2] Motives are also used in other aspects of a specific case, for instance, when police are initially investigating. We have given recognition to these principles in our cases which have discussed the "remedial phase" of class action disparate treatment cases. He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts that concededly never existed. Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. See McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Association Council, 830 F.2d 659, 665 (CA7 1987), cert. Moreover, since we hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the issue whether gender played a part in the employment decision, the situation before us is not the one of "shifting burdens" that we addressed in Burdine. 3019, 3062, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986) (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("[T]he general policy under Title VII is to limit relief for racial discrimination in employment practices to actual victims of the discrimination"). The practical importance of the burden of proof is the "risk of nonpersuasion," and the new system will make a difference only where the evidence is so evenly balanced that the factfinder cannot say that either side's explanation of the case is "more likely" true. The Court of Appeals affirmed. [3] "Motive" describes instead the reasons in the accused's background and station in life that are supposed to have induced the crime. 1370, 1375, n. 13, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). In Mt. 110 Cong.Rec. In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part. Where an evaluation is based on a subjective assessment of a person's strengths and weaknesses, it is simply not true that each evaluator will focus on, or even mention, the same weaknesses. Id., at 287, 97 S.Ct., at 576 (footnote omitted). Perhaps such cases in the future will require a bifurcated trial, with the jury retiring first to make the credibility findings necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has proved that an impermissible factor played a substantial part in the decision, and later hearing evidence on the "same decision" or "pretext" issues. If this state of affairs is proved to the factfinder, there will be no liability under the plurality's own test, for the same decision would have been made had the illegitimate reason never been considered. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). While the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in a disparate impact case may both be indicators of discrimination or its "functional equivalent," they are not, in and of themselves, the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment setting. As the plurality notes, the District Court based its liability determination on expert evidence that some evaluations of respondent Hopkins were based on unconscious sex stereotypes,5 and on the fact that Price Waterhouse failed to disclaim reliance on these comments when it conducted the partnership review. "The crucial difference between an individual's claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The plurality went on to emphasize that in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may not simply point to a statistical disparity in the employer's work force. The law may require more than but-for cause, for instance proximate cause, before imposing liability. This recommendation will be either that the firm accept the candidate for partnership, put her application on "hold," or deny her the promotion outright. That decision was for the finder of fact, however, and the District Court made plain that sex discrimination was not a but-for cause of the decision to place Hopkins' partnership candidacy on hold. 1244, 89 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365-366 (CA4 1985); Peters v. Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1161 (CA5 1987); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Assn. With respect to the employer's burden, however, the plurality seems to require, at least in most cases, that the employer submit objective evidence that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S.Ct. Any standard less than but-for, however, simply represents a decision to impose liability without causation. The only individual disparate treatment case cited by the dissent which involved the kind of direct evidence of discriminatory animus with which we are confronted here is United States Postal Service Bd. Pp. Our opinions make plain that Burdine applies to all individual disparate-treatment cases, whether the plaintiff offers direct proof that discrimination motivated the employer's actions or chooses the indirect method of showing that the employer's proffered justification is false, that is to say, a pretext. 29 U.S.C. Title VII expressly provides that an employer need not give preferential treatment to employees or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in order to maintain a work force in balance with the general population. Our decision in Texas Dept. KEY TAKEAWAYS . Under the accepted approach to causation that I have discussed, sex is a cause for the employment decision whenever, either by itself or in combination with other factors it made a difference to the decision. The BFOQ provisions allow an employer, in certain cases, to make an employment decision of which it is conceded that sex is the cause. law and strong business con˜dence may help encourage businesses to focus on capex to increase ef˜ciency and improve competitiveness. Means, Motive, and Opportunity ... that greater gun ownership by responsible and law-abiding citizens would diminish the capacity of weaponized killers … The judge went on to decide, however, that some of the partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such comments. Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and suppose that either force acting alone would have moved the object. No one contends, however, that sex must be the sole cause of a decision before there is a Title VII violation. . ), suggests to me that an affirmative showing of causation should be required. 618 F.Supp., at 1117. While the main concern of the statute was with employment opportunity, Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of one's race or sex. 31); a third advised her to take "a course at charm school" (Defendant's Exh. 683, 691, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983). Labels aside, the import of today's decision is not that Title VII liability can arise without but-for causation, but that in certain cases it is not the plaintiff who must prove the presence of causation, but the defendant who must prove its absence.